Moving Past A  Pocket Change  Settlement:  The Threat of Preemption and How the Loss of Chance Doctrine Can Help NFL Concussion Plaintiffs Prove Causation by Guccione, John
Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 22 | Issue 2 Article 11
2014
Moving Past A "Pocket Change" Settlement: The
Threat of Preemption and How the Loss of Chance
Doctrine Can Help NFL Concussion Plaintiffs
Prove Causation
John Guccione
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
John Guccione, Moving Past A "Pocket Change" Settlement: The Threat of Preemption and How the Loss of Chance Doctrine Can Help NFL
Concussion Plaintiffs Prove Causation, 22 J. L. & Pol'y (2014).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol22/iss2/11
2014.05.19 GUCCIONE.DOCX 5/19/2014 11:29 AM 
 
909 
MOVING PAST A “POCKET CHANGE” 
SETTLEMENT: THE THREAT OF 
PREEMPTION AND HOW THE LOSS OF 
CHANCE DOCTRINE CAN HELP NFL 







On August 29, 2013, retired Judge Layn R. Phillips1 
announced a “historic” $765 million settlement proposal between 
the National Football League (“NFL” or the “League”) and over 
4,500 retired football players.2 The plaintiffs, former NFL 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2015; B.A., SUNY College at 
Geneseo, 2010. I would like to thank my wonderful parents, Tom and Karen 
Guccione, as well as my friends and family for their amazing support. I also 
wish to thank the members of the Journal of Law and Policy for their excellent 
suggestions and generous sacrifices in time and energy. Special thanks to 
Tiffany Colón, whose love and incredible encouragement, patience, and 
kindness has made this note, and all else, possible for me. 
1 On July 8, 2013, U.S. District Court Judge Anita B. Brody appointed 
former federal prosecutor and federal judge, Layn R. Philips, as mediator to 
settle claims between the NFL and thousands of former players. John P. 
Martin, Judge Sends NFL Concussion Case to Mediation, PHILLY.COM (July 
10, 2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-07-10/news/40471942_1_phillips-
nfl-concussion-case-mediator. 
2 The retired players who sued the league will be referred to as 
“concussion plaintiffs,” “plaintiffs,” and “former players/athletes.” The 
agreement is not final, as it is still pending the preliminary approval of Judge 
Brody.  The settlement specifically allocates $75 million for baseline medical 
exams, $675 million for cognitive injury compensation, and $10 million for 
research and education, along with monies for the costs of notice to the class, 
settlement administrator compensation, and legal fees. Press Release, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Ctr., NFL, Retired Players Resolve 
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athletes, accused the League of being aware of, and actively 
concealing, evidence linking football to mild traumatic brain 
injuries and their resulting “pathological and debilitating” 
neurological effects.3 The plaintiffs alleged “intentional tortious 
misconduct” by the NFL, “including fraud, intentional 
misrepresentation, and negligence,” and sought “a declaration of 
liability, injunctive relief, medical monitoring, and financial 
compensation for the long-term chronic injuries” the plaintiffs 
sustained during their NFL careers.4 
Reactions to the proposed agreement varied greatly. For a 
number of those closely involved in the litigation and settlement 
process, there was an initial attitude of satisfaction on both sides.5 
For example, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell remarked, “this 
[settlement is] best for the game going forward,” and “best for 
the players, and that’s what’s important.”6 NFL Executive Vice 
President Jeffrey Pash reiterated the League’s apparent 
commitment to the well-being of athletes and their families: “This 
agreement lets us help those who need it most and continue our 
work to make the game safer for current and future players.”7 
Judge Phillips, who oversaw the parties’ negotiations, stated the 
proposed settlement would ensure retired NFL athletes received 
necessary financial support, at a time when they most needed it.8  
On the players’ side, Kevin Turner, a former running back 
and a lead plaintiff in the litigation, assured the public that the 
                                                          
Concussion Litigation (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter ADR Press Release]. 
3 Plaintiffs’ Amended Master Administrative Long-Form Complaint at 1, 
In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 2d 708 (E.D. Pa. 
July 17, 2014) (MDL No. 12-md-2323) [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Master 
Complaint]. 
4 Id. 
5 See, e.g., What People Are Saying, NFL CONCUSSION LITIG., 
http://www.nflconcussionmdl.org/what-people-are-saying/ (last visited Mar. 
28, 2014) (listing testimonials of former NFL players, reporters, and legal 
experts expressing relief and gratitude as a result of the NFL settlement).  
6 Ian Begley, Roger Goodell Defends Settlement, ESPN (Sept. 4, 2013), 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/9633728/roger-goodell-defends-765-million-
concussion-settlement. 
7 ADR Press Release, supra note 2. 
8 Id. 
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benefits of the agreement would make a difference for thousands 
of former athletes, both now and in the future.9 Christopher 
Seeger, co-lead plaintiffs’ attorney, reiterated this message, 
stating that the agreement “will get help quickly to the men who 
suffered neurological injuries . . . [f]aster and at far less cost, 
both financially and emotionally, than could have ever been 
accomplished by continuing to litigate.”10 
Despite such positive responses, other commentators and 
former players expressed immediate dissatisfaction. A number of 
experts and former NFL players spoke out against the settlement, 
highlighting a number of terms that clearly favored the League.11 
In addition, simply by settling (regardless of the final terms) the 
NFL was afforded a number of protections they would have lost 
had the litigation continued. For example, as with most 
settlements, the proposed terms expressly articulated that the 
agreement in no way represented an admission of liability on the 
part of the NFL.12 Many commentators also noted that by 
agreeing to settle, the NFL avoided an extremely damaging 
discovery process.13 Should the case have moved forward, 
plaintiffs’ counsel likely would have deposed the Leagues’ staff 
and obtained access to internal documents and e-mails through the 
                                                          
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Former running back Leroy Hoard, for example, expressed concern 
regarding the fact that the second half of settlement monies are distributed over 
a long 17-year period, while punter Chris Kluwe and former linebacker Aaron 
Curry worried that the settlement, while helpful, would not provide sufficient 
compensation. Reaction to the Concussion Deal, ESPN (Aug. 30, 2013), 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/9612672/reaction-nfl-concussion-settlement. 
12 ADR Press Release, supra note 2. 
13 See, e.g., LaMar C. Campbell, Opinion, NFL Concussion Settlement 
Raises Questions, CNN (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/08/ 
opinion/campbell-nfl-lawsuit/ (“[T]he league does not have to face the 
discovery and deposition process and therefore leaves many questions 
unanswered.”); Daniel Engber, Opinion, NFL Concussion Settlement Doesn’t 
Show Us How Dangerous Football Really Is, THE BUFFALO NEWS (Sept. 8, 
2013), http://www.buffalonews.com/opinion/nfl-concussion-settlement-doesnt-
show-us-how-dangerous-football-really-is-20130908 (“[T]hey would have been 
forced to put a huge library of internal documents on the record.”).  
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discovery process, revealing exactly what the NFL knew and 
allegedly concealed from players and the general public.14 
Owners would have faced “continuing accusations of abusing 
players,” as highly skilled and motivated plaintiffs’ counsel 
would have conducted “nothing less than a strip search of NFL 
records.”15 Escaping an admission of liability also meant the NFL 
avoided one of the Plaintiffs’ key allegations: that the League 
knew the dangers and risks of repeated concussions, that it 
voluntarily undertook the responsibilities of studying NFL head 
injuries, and ultimately concealed their long term effects.16 In the 
words of former NFL Players Union President and Pro-Bowler, 
Kevin Mawae, while the settlement was great for older players in 
need of immediate help, it constituted “$700 million worth of 
hush money that [the NFL] will never be accountable for.”17 
Issues with the proposed settlement extend beyond the 
League’s ability to avoid admitting liability and evade discovery 
process disclosure. A number of critics have also expressed doubt 
with regard to the adequacy of the underlying settlement amount, 
going so far as to call it “barely a drop in the bucket.”18 Indeed, 
for an organization that currently generates approximately $9 
billion a year in revenue, the $765 million settlement amount 
reflects “less than half of what ESPN alone pays the League 
                                                          
14 See Campbell, supra note 13. 
15 Lester Munson, Mediation Could Be the Answer, ESPN (July 9, 2013), 
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/9462264/questions-answers-judge-
decision-send-nfl-concussion-lawsuit-mediation. 
16 See Plaintiffs’ Master Complaint, supra note 3, at 23, 32. 
17 Barry Wilner, NFL Concussion Settlement Draws Mixed Reactions  
From Former Players, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/30/nfl-concussion-settlement-former-
players_n_3845954.html. 
18 Bill Barnwell, What You Need to Know About the NFL’s  
$765 Million Concussion Settlement,  GRANTLAND (Aug. 29, 2013), 
http://www.grantland.com/blog/the-triangle/post/_/id/72867/what-you-need-
to-know-about-the-nfls-765-million-concussion-settlement; See Arthur L. 
Caplan & Lee H. Igel, What’s Unsettled About the NFL Concussion 
Settlement, FORBES (Aug. 30, 2013, 6:26 PM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/leeigel/2013/08/30/whats-unsettled-about-the-nfl-concussions-settlement/. 
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annually.”19 Some early commentators predicted that the suit 
could be worth as much as $10 billion, assuming each injured 
player and their family received an award of $500,000.20 In 
January 2013, Paul M. Barrett of Businessweek hypothesized a 
$5 billion agreement.21 Even the more grounded figures initially 
sought by the plaintiffs were in excess of $2 billion; over 260% 
more than the proposed settlement amount.22 As former 
Minnesota Vikings player and current plaintiff Brent Boyd 
lamented, “$765 Million? The breakdown is $1.2 million over 20 
years per team. What is that, a third of the average salary? There 
is no penalty there. It’s pocket change.”23 
Presiding U.S. District Judge Anita Brody ultimately 
validated these concerns on January 14, 2014 by refusing to grant 
the settlement preliminary approval.24 Before the proposed class 
action settlement agreement could take effect, Judge Brody had to 
give her approval pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
                                                          
19 Patrick Hruby, Q&A: The NFL’s Concussion Deal, THE ROTATION 
(Aug. 30, 2013), http://therotation.sportsonearthblog.com/qa-the-nfls-
concussion-deal/. In 2011, ESPN agreed to a deal extending through 2021 
where the NFL would receive $1.9 billion a year in return for ESPN’s right to 
broadcast mainly Monday Night Football.  Richard Sandomir, ESPN Extends 
Deal with NFL for $15 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/sports/football/espn-extends-deal-with-
nfl-for-15-billion.html. 
20 See Glenn M. Wong, SN Concussion Report: NFL Could Lose  
Billions in Player Lawsuits, SPORTING NEWS (Aug. 22, 2012), 
http://www.sportingnews.com/nfl/story/2012-08-22/nfl-concussion-lawsuits-
money-bankrupt-players-sue-head-injuries. This prediction was made when 
only 3,000 former players were involved. Applying this $500,000 per player 
award to the number of plaintiffs ultimately involved in the settlement would 
result in even greater damages. See id. 
21 Paul M. Barrett, Will Brain Injury Lawsuits Doom or Save the NFL?, 
BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-
01-31/will-brain-injury-lawsuits-doom-or-save-the-nfl. 
22 Steve Fainaru & Mark Fainaru-Wada, Players Sought $2 Billion From 
NFL, ESPN (Sept. 1, 2013), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/ 
id/9622926/players-initially-sought-2-billion-plus-nfl-concussion-settlement. 
23 See Wilner, supra note 17. 
24 In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 2d 708 
(E.D. Pa. 2014). 
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23(e).25 In class actions such as this, the court “must assure ‘to 
the greatest extent possible that the actions are prosecuted on 
behalf of the actual class members in a way that makes it fair to 
bind their interests.’”26 Because class action settlements can bind 
absent class members who did not participate in the litigation, 
Rule 23(e) requires judges to ensure the agreement is “fair, 
reasonable, and adequate” irrespective of the parties’ approval.27 
While the Judge noted that Plaintiffs’ counsel “believed” the 
aggregate sum of the settlement was sufficient based on “analysis 
conducted by the independent economists or actuaries retained by 
the parties,” she had concerns about the settlement’s “fairness, 
reasonableness, and adequacy,” as such analyses were not 
actually provided to the Court.28 Brody refused to grant 
preliminary approval until documentary proof of the settlement’s 
fairness was provided.29 
Judge Brody also expressed concern that the funds would be 
insufficient to compensate all class members who received a 
“Qualifying Diagnosis” (such as dementia, Alzheimer’s, or 
Parkinson’s Disease), resulting in the settlement’s largest 
payouts.30 Brody noted that the settlement “contemplates a 65-
year lifespan,” and was expected to cover a class of around 
20,000 individuals. She found it “difficult to see how the 
Monetary Award Fund would have the funds available over its 
lifespan to pay all claimants at these significant award levels.”31 
As of April 2014, the settlement remains on hold.32 
Given the apparent inadequacies of the proposed settlement, 
and assuming that such amounts may not be increased in the 
future, litigation may be the only way that former-NFL players 
                                                          
25 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e); In re NFL, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 713–14. 
26 In re NFL, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 713 (citation omitted). 
27 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
28 In re NFL, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 716. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 715. 
31 Id.  
32 Sam Farmer, Federal Judge Holds Off Decision on NFL Concussion 
Settlement, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/sports/ 
sportsnow/la-sp-sn-nfl-concussions-20140416,0,579644.story. 
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can be assured of an adequate remedy. However, there are 
serious problems with the plaintiffs’ claims.33 First, plaintiffs 
must be wary of the possibility that their claims will be 
preempted by federal law, forcing them to be resolved through 
arbitration pursuant to the NFL-NFL Players’ Association 
collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”), rather than a court 
proceeding. If the plaintiffs are forced to arbitrate, they lose the 
benefit of a trial where potentially sympathetic jurors might favor 
the many badly injured and allegedly misled plaintiffs, instead 
facing a more neutral decision-maker less likely to award 
significant damages.  
Second, players must be able to prove causation—that is, that 
the NFL caused their injuries. This is no easy task when some 
athletes may already have had a predisposition to diseases like 
Alzheimer’s, and may have sustained brain injuries in non-NFL 
football activities, such as high school and college football, and in 
their personal lives. To help resolve this issue, the courts and the 
plaintiffs should look to extend the “loss of chance doctrine,” 
traditionally applied only in medical malpractice lawsuits, 34 to 
the NFL. The doctrine allows injured parties to recover damages 
for the “reduction in odds of recovery” caused by a defendant’s 
negative contributions, even if plaintiffs cannot show that the 
alleged injuries were “caused in fact by the defendant’s 
                                                          
33 One such issue this Note will not discuss is class certification, which 
has not occurred due to acceptance of the proposed settlement. Though NFL 
athletes could still bring individual suits for their injuries, certification will 
pose a major barrier for players, especially their medical monitoring claims. 
Since “liability turns on the specific facts of each class member’s claimed 
exposure,” and class members may not share identical risks of harm, some 
argue such claims are not “indivisible,” and that class certification would be 
denied. Sheila B. Scheuerman, The NFL Concussion Litigation: A Critical 
Assessment of Class Certification, 8 FIU L. REV. 81, 105 (2012); see also 
TIMOTHY LIAM EPSTEIN, SMITHAMUNDSEN LLC, NFL CONCUSSION CLASS 
ACTION LITIGATION, available at http://www.dri.org/DRI/course-
materials/2012-AM/pdfs/39b_Epstein.pdf. 
34 For a discussion of the “loss of chance doctrine,” see generally 
Margaret T. Mangan, Comment, The Loss of Chance Doctrine: A Small Price 
to Pay for Human Life, 42 S.D. L. REV. 279 (1997). 
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negligence.”35 As long as an injured party can demonstrate that a 
defendant’s actions lessened their ability to recover, the defendant 
may be held liable for that reduction.36  
Through the loss of chance doctrine, plaintiffs can argue that 
despite possible neurological disease predispositions and brain 
injuries arising outside of the NFL, the League conflated these 
risks and should therefore be held liable for the plaintiffs’ 
resulting reduced changes of recovery. Given the unfavorable 
terms of the proposed settlement37 and the risk it will ultimately 
be rejected, an extension of loss of chance to nonmedical 
malpractice torts (though it must be limited, and has its risks38) 
provides a great opportunity for plaintiffs to succeed on their 
merits and hold the NFL accountable.  
Fortunately, even if Judge Brody ultimately approves the 
settlement of In re National Football League Players’ Concussion 
Injury Litigation,39 disgruntled plaintiffs will have an opportunity 
to opt out.40 Although doing so would significantly delay 
resolution of the opting-out plaintiff’s claims, those that can 
afford to do so should strongly consider it, as they could continue 
litigating along with former football players not currently 
                                                          
35 Andrew S. Kaufman, Determining Valuation in Loss of Chance Cases, 
N.Y. L.J., Dec. 21, 2009, available at http://kbrlaw.com/kaufman3.pdf. 
36 Id. 
37 See, e.g., Steve Fainaru & Mark Fainaru-Wada, Some Players May Be 
Out of NFL Deal, ESPN CHICAGO (Sept. 20, 2013), http://espn.go.com/ 
chicago/story/_/id/9690036/older-players-cut-nfl-settlement-concerns-growing-
whether-enough-money-exists; Patrick Hruby, Don’t Settle, SPORTS ON EARTH 
(Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/60617808/. 
38 See generally David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of a Chance, 
36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 605 (2001). One concern is that the doctrine, once 
accepted widely, becomes difficult to limit and may “swallow” the traditional 
more-likely-than-not rule. Id. at 606–07. If this happened, there are concerns 
that all negligent actors could wrongly become liable for injuries they did not 
cause but somewhat contributed to, an extremely uncertain determination in 
many contexts. 
39 In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 2d 708 
(E.D. Pa. 2014). 
40 Class Action Settlement Agreement at 59–61, In re NFL Players’ 
Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 2d 708 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (MDL No. 12-
md-2323). 
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involved in the lawsuit but interested in pursuing individual 
claims. While threat of federal law compelling arbitration 
pursuant to the CBA is possible, preemption should not apply 
here. Additionally, while proving causation will be difficult, there 
are methods available for the plaintiffs to do so, including 
through a potential extension of the loss of chance doctrine.  
Part II will discuss the adequacy of the proposed concussion 
litigation settlement, specifically whether it provides sufficient 
sums to compensate former players and provide for their medical 
care, and how the uncertainties of litigation and the necessity for 
immediate relief incentivized the plaintiffs to accept an 
unfavorable settlement. Part III will discuss the threat of 
preemption, and why it should not be applied to this case. Part IV 
will discuss the issues inherent in proving causation and offer a 
potential solution through judicial extension of the loss of chance 
doctrine. Should NFL concussion plaintiffs pursue litigation, 
avoid preemption, and prove causation, they will be able to hold 
the NFL accountable for its actions, and may better assure 
themselves and their families of fair compensation. 
 
II. ISSUES OF TIMING AND CERTAINTY INDUCED PLAYERS TO 
SETTLE 
 
A. Adequacy and Timing 
 
The proposed settlement agreement has various components. 
First, the NFL will provide $675 million over an extended period 
to compensate former players for their injuries, with various 
payments depending on the player’s individual diagnosis.41 For 
example, the settlement awards a maximum of $3 million for 
“moderate dementia,” $3.5 million for Alzheimer’s or 
Parkinson’s Disease, $4 million for death with chronic traumatic 
encephalopathy (CTE), a degenerative brain disease associated 
with multiple concussions, and $5 million for amyotrophic lateral 
                                                          
41 Class Action Settlement Agreement, Exhibit B-5 at 6, In re NFL 
Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 2d 708 (E.D. Pa. 2014) 
(MDL No. 12-md-2323). 
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sclerosis (ALS), or Lou Gehrig’s Disease.42 The NFL will also 
provide an additional $75 million for medical testing, $10 million 
for educational purposes, and $4 million for class notice costs.43 
It also provides for over $110 million in attorney’s fees44 and an 
additional $37.5 million contribution if the Settlement 
Administrator determines the Injury Fund is inadequate.45 
Settlement funds are expected to last for sixty-five years.46 
Despite a proposed settlement that appears to include a large 
amount of funds, there is good reason to support the doubts of 
Judge Brody and a large number of journalists, experts, and 
members of the class action. Though Christopher Seeger (lead co-
counsel for the plaintiffs) made public assurances that 
forthcoming reports from experts, economists, and actuaries 
would confirm that the proposed settlement will be “sufficiently 
funded,” some basic mathematics have brought that claim into 
serious question.47 Judge Brody expressed concerns that the 
settlement provides insufficient compensation if “even . . . only 
10 percent” of retired players qualify for one of the tiers outlined 
above.48 Indeed, enrollment numbers in prior NFL player injury 
compensation programs have indicated that the number of players 
with serious brain injuries may be high enough to quickly empty 
                                                          
42 These maximum awards are reduced if the former player played less 
than five “Eligible Seasons,” and/or if the player was diagnosed after the age 
of forty-five. Id. at 11–13. 
43 ADR Press Release, supra note 2. 
44 Sofia Pearson & Jef Feeley, NFL’s $914 Million Concussion Deal 
Submitted for Approval, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.bloomberg 
.com/news/2014-01-06/nfl-s-765-million-concussion-deal-submitted-for-
approval.html.  
45 Jason Lisk, NFL Reaches Proposed Settlement with Former Players in 
Concussion Litigation, For Over $765 Million Plus Attorney’s Fees, THE BIG 
LEAD (Aug. 29, 2013), http://thebiglead.com/2013/08/29/nfl-reaches-
proposed-settlement-with-former-players-in-concussion-litigation-for-over-765-
million-plus-attorneys-fees/. 
46 Class Action Settlement Agreement, supra note 40, at 32. 
47 Fainaru & Fainaru-Wada, supra note 37. 
48 In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 2d 708, 715 
(E.D. Pa. 2014). 
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the fund.49  
One such program is the NFL’s “88 Plan,” implemented in 
2007.50 The 88 Plan is a program designed to provide nearly 
$100,000 in yearly aid for the medical and custodial expenses of 
qualified former players suffering specifically from dementia, 
including “dementia due to head trauma.”51 The League designed 
the 88 Plan partly in response to increasing media attention and 
player complaints regarding the effects of concussions.52 Since 
2007, 223 former NFL players have qualified for the program, 
and the League has approved over $23 million in assistance.53 It 
is likely many of these individuals would also qualify for the 
proposed settlement’s larger payment tiers, which includes 
awards of $3 million for dementia and $5 million for 
Alzheimer’s,54 since the 88 Plan was specifically designed to aid 
players diagnosed with dementia.  
Patrick Hruby of Sports on Earth, an online sports blog, used 
numbers from 88 Plan enrollment to argue against the adequacy 
of the proposed settlement. He accounted for the 233 athletes that 
qualified for the 88 Plan, and added to that number, thirty-four 
former players who have already been diagnosed with CTE (a 
disease not covered by the 88 Plan, but covered under the 
                                                          
49 See Patrick Hruby, Don’t Settle, SPORTS ON EARTH (Sept. 16, 2013), 
http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/60617808/. 
50 Alan Schwartz, Before Dementia Assistance, Help With N.F.L. 
Application, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 
01/22/sports/football/22eckwood.html?_r=0. 
51 The plan was named in honor of Hall of Famer John Mackey, who 
wore the number 88 on his football jersey. NFL PLAYER 88 PLAN 4 (2007), 
available at http://nflretired.baughweb.com/Resources/88%20Plan.pdf. 
52 See Sally Jenkins & Rick Maese, Do No Harm: Who Should Bear the 
Costs of Retired NFL Players’ Medical Bills?, WASH. POST (May 9, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/redskins/do-no-harm-who-should-bear-
the-costs-of-retired-nfl-players-medical-bills/2013/05/09/2dae88ba-b70e-11e2-
b568-6917f6ac6d9d_story.html.   
53 Id.   
54 See Bruce Arthur, Former NFL Players Facing Costly, Unwinnable 
Fight Over Concussion Settlement, NAT’L POST (Sept. 22, 2013), 
http://sports.nationalpost.com/2013/09/22/former-nfl-players-facing-costly-
unwinnable-fight-over-concussion-settlement/. 
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settlement).55 He took the sum, 267, and multiplied it by an 
average award of $2 million.56 The amount, $534 million, 
accounts for a vast majority of the available funds, without 
adding any newly diagnosed injuries whatsoever.57 In addition, 
less than one third of retired NFL players were involved in the 
concussion litigation at issue, but under the proposed settlement, 
all retired NFL players would be eligible for this fund.58 It is also 
possible that concussion-related, long-term injuries will only 
increase as time goes on. Younger players have generally played 
more football than their predecessors (from youth leagues to high 
school and collegiate football), during a period where athletes 
have generated greater impacts59 and commonly used painkillers 
like Toradol,60 which may have exacerbated concussion harms.61 
In other words, not only may there already be enough retired 
NFL athletes to empty the settlement funds, but the number of 
retired players with qualifying diagnoses will likely increase with 
time. 
The proposed settlement also has serious issues outside the 
amount of overall compensation. Many seriously impaired 
plaintiffs may not qualify for seven-figure awards, yet will need 
or are already receiving nursing home care, where residence 
                                                          
55 Hruby, supra note 49. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. According to Hruby, there are between 15,000 and 18,000 living 
retired NFL players.  The concussion litigation here had around 4,600 
plaintiffs.  Id.    
59 Michaeleen Doucleff & Adam Cole, Are NFL Football Hits Getting 
Harder and More Dangerous?, NPR (Feb. 1, 2013, 12:02PM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/01/31/170764982/are-nfl-football-hits-
getting-harder-and-more-dangerous. 
60 Todarol, a painkiller with blood-thinning effects, was the subject of a 
2011 lawsuit where players alleged that the drug’s ability to dull pain made it 
more difficult for players to recognize concussion symptoms. See Ken Belson, 
Ex-NFL Players Suing Over Use of Painkiller, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/sports/football/nfl-sued-by-ex-players-
over-painkiller-toradol.html. 
61 See Hruby, supra note 49. 
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costs can average $80,000 per year—and often much more.62 The 
proposed settlement also disqualifies awards for the families of 
former players diagnosed with “football-related brain damage” 
who died prior to 2006, precluding a number of wrongful death 
suits.63  
In addition, while the proposed settlement will take care of 
some of the plaintiffs’ legal fees,64 many former athletes may still 
have to pay significant portions of any awards to their attorneys. 
Instead of fees being paid out of the settlement, dozens of 
plaintiffs’ attorneys would collect fees directly from their clients 
pursuant to previously negotiated agreements.65 This means not 
only will some attorneys get as much as one-third of their clients’ 
settlement monies directly from the players, but they may be paid 
twice, receiving a share of the League’s settlement fund as well.66 
Nonetheless, Commissioner Goodell defended the proposed 
settlement against such concerns about its inadequacy, attempting 
to dispel the notion that the NFL could have afforded a higher 
settlement. Goodell noted that despite the NFL grossing 
approximately $10 billion per year, because “there’s a difference 
between making (money) and revenue,” the settlement was best 
for the plaintiffs and a “tremendous amount of money.”67 This 
                                                          
62 See Caplan & Igel, supra note 18. 
63 Class Action Settlement Agreement, supra note 40, at 29. The NFL 
hoped to bar all wrongful death claims from the settlement whose two-year 
statute of limitations (typical for most states) had expired.  While negotiations 
extended the provisions to players dying after 2006, the families of those dying 
prior to that year were not included. See Fainaru & Fainaru-Wada, supra note 
37. 
64 See ADR Press Release, supra note 2. 
65 See Fainaru & Fainaru-Wada, supra note 37. 
66 See id. 
67 Begley, supra note 6 (alteration in original). Some, like Goodell, were 
quick to evaluate the effectiveness of the settlement solely based on the dollar 
amount, without reference to the staggering costs and debilitating injuries 
sustained by former players. For example, on the day of the settlement 
announcement, Sports Illustrated writer Peter King tweeted sarcastically: “I 
love everyone calling $765m chump change.” Peter King, TWITTER (Aug. 29, 
2013, 1:30PM), https://twitter.com/SI_PeterKing/status/373135592684396 
544. 
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argument was lampooned by Deadspin writer Reuben Fischer-
Baum, who noted the League will generate approximately $180 
billion in profits by the time the entire settlement is paid out to 
the plaintiffs.68 The proposed settlement would account for only 
0.425% of this projection. 
Although the parties’ agreement raises serious questions, 
some individuals have considered it a necessary evil. Many 
commentators, former and current NFL athletes, and legal 
experts examined the settlement from the players’ perspective, 
and noted that while settling could cause the plaintiffs to lose 
billions of dollars and an admission of liability, an agreement 
assured the plaintiffs of both timeliness and certainty.69 As Brett 
Romberg, an initial plaintiff in 2010, stated, although the NFL 
“messed up in the past,” the $765 million “will be a much-
needed Band-Aid, especially for those who suffered injuries 20 
and 30 years ago.”70 
Timing was perhaps the paramount issue for the former 
players with the most developed injuries and diseases.71 Kevin 
Turner, a 44-year-old former running back suffering from ALS 
or Lou Gehrig’s disease,72 stated that “[f]or those who are 
                                                          
68 Reuben Fischer-Baum, Infographic: The NFL’s Puny Concussion 
Settlement, Visualized, DEADSPIN (August 29, 2013, 4:14 PM), 
http://deadspin.com/infographic-the-nfls-puny-concussion-settlement-visu-
1222822576. This is likely a conservative estimate, as it assumes the NFL 
maintains, and will not exceed, its current profit levels.  
69 See Patrick Rishe, Time, Certainty Explain Why NFL Players Settled 
for Less in Concussion Lawsuit, FORBES (Sept. 4, 2013 1:34 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/prishe/2013/09/04/time-certainty-explain-why-
nfl-players-settled-for-less-in-concussion-lawsuit/. 
70 Romberg Supports Proposed NFL Deal, WINDSOR STAR (Aug. 30, 
2013), http://www2.canada.com/windsorstar/news/story.html?id=30957b5d-
5fbc-41bd-9f27-f361a63626fd.  Romberg eventually removed himself from the 
litigation, and unretired in order to sign with the Atlanta Falcons in 2012. Id. 
71 See Jim Litke, NFL Settlement a “Win-Win” for Everyone, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 29, 2013), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/column-nfl-
settlement-win-win-everyone (“The [settlement] benefits proposed are . . . 
desperately needed. It won’t restore lives . . . nor heal broken minds . . . . But 
it would provide help right away to generations of past players still suffering 
the effects of concussion-related injuries.”). 
72 ALS is a “progressive neurodegenerative disease that affects nerve cells 
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hurting, this will bring comfort today . . . . The compensation in 
this settlement will lift a huge burden off the men who are 
suffering right now.”73 Indeed, the plaintiffs include former 
players as old as eighty-four years old, many of whom played 
less than three years in the League, some of whom never made it 
on an NFL roster, and many of whom have been rendered 
incapable of holding a job.74 These factors have created a large 
class of individuals who have serious long-term injuries but little 
money, placing a huge burden on these players and their 
families.75 Mary Lee Kocourek, widow of Dave Kocourek—a 
nine-year professional and four-time AFL All-Star—described the 
hardships the couple faced less than a year before Dave passed 
away.76 Doctors diagnosed Dave with dementia before his sixty-
fifth birthday, and his condition deteriorated to the point that 
Mary Lee had no choice but to place him in a nursing home.77 
Although she received some financial help from the NFL, the 
cost of nursing home care was close to $80,000 annually, while 
Dave’s yearly salary as a professional never exceeded $35,000.78 
By agreeing to settle with the NFL, the former players and 
their families in the most need would receive immediate help, 
                                                          
in the brain and the spinal cord,” eventually leading to paralysis and death. 
What is ALS?, ALS ASS’N, http://www.alsa.org/about-als/what-is-als.html. 
One study showed that the risk of ALS and Alzheimer’s disease among 
football players is between three and four times greater than that of the general 
population.  See Everett J. Lehman et al., Neurodegenerative Causes of Death 
Among Retired National Football League Players, 79 NEUROLOGY 1 (2012). 
73 Mike Jensen, Former Players React to NFL Concussion Settlement, 
PHILLY.COM (Aug. 31, 2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-08-31/sports/ 
41622028_1_retired-players-nfl-chris-kluwe (emphasis added). 
74 See Nathan Fenno, Many Ex-Redskins Among Those Suing NFL Over 
Effects of Brain Injuries, WASH. TIMES (Jun. 20, 2012), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jun/20/price-of-pain-many-ex-
redskins-among-those-suing-n. 
75 See Melissa Segura, The Other Half of the Story, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED 
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rather than waiting until litigation is resolved, possibly years 
down the road. Rejecting settlement offers and proceeding with 
the lawsuit could have easily delayed monetary aid to the 
plaintiffs for at least another two years, given the complexities of 
the suit, and possibly resulted in even less compensation.79 These 
are people who need funds now. If Judge Brody eventually grants 
preliminary approval, the decision will likely be appealed, which 
will prevent class members from opting out of the settlement and 
fully pursing their own claims until all appeals are fully 
exhausted.80 Given these harsh realities, and the fact that the 
terms of the current settlement require the NFL to pay 
approximately fifty percent of the settlement amount over the next 
three years, it is not surprising that many concussion litigation 
plaintiffs support the proposed settlement.81 Though there is 
substantial evidence that the current agreement is not the best 
agreement that the plaintiffs could have achieved, it nonetheless 
provides some immediate help to those suffering the most.  
 
B. The Problem of Certainty 
 
Certainty of the outcome of litigation was another major issue 
for the players. If the plaintiffs do not receive any assistance from 
the NFL, many will be unable to continue paying for their 
medical care.82 The figures of the proposed settlement, despite its 
inadequacies, at least guaranteed the plaintiffs some assistance 
with medical bills. Paul D. Anderson, attorney and concussion 
litigation expert, asserted that despite the settlement’s 
shortcomings, “when balanced against the lives of many players 
and families that are on the verge of bankruptcy and death, the 
urgency is clear. Guaranteed money now is much better than no 
                                                          
79 Rishe, supra note 69. 
80 Jacob Gershman, Concern Raised Over Opt-Out Terms of NFL 
Concussion Settlement, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (Jan. 28, 2014, 1:11 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/01/28/concern-raised-over-opt-out-terms-of-nfl-
concussion-settlement/. 
81 The balance of the settlement would be paid over the subsequent 
seventeen years. See ADR Press Release, supra note 2. 
82 See Jenkins & Maese, supra note 52.  
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money after years of litigation.”83 The settlement was partly 
induced by fears that should the former players fail to settle, their 
lawsuit could end in dismissal or a judgment for the NFL.84 
Paramount among these fears was the issue of preemption by the 
NFL-NFL Players’ Association (“NFLPA”) CBA, the challenges 
of obtaining class certification, and the difficulty associated with 
proving tort causation.   
While avoiding preemption and proving causation will be 
difficult, the apparent inadequacies of the proposed settlement 
may make going to trial necessary, as litigation may be the only 
route to ensure fair compensation.85 Subsequent examination of 
the proposed terms indicate that while the settlement could lessen 
the burden on those injured plaintiffs in the most need, many 
others would not receive the security they envisioned and 
deserve. In addition, further pursuing a lawsuit would allow for 
discovery, disclose the NFL’s private information, and could 
force the League to admit liability. Though the road is uncertain, 
preemption should not affect the plaintiff’s claims, and increasing 
medical evidence—along with a possible extension of the loss of 
chance doctrine—could allow plaintiffs to succeed at trial. 
 
III.  THE THREAT OF PREEMPTION 
 
A. Section 301 
 
If the plaintiffs did not agree to settle, they faced the 
possibility that the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 
                                                          
83 Paul D. Anderson Consulting, LLC, Report: Judge Brody Threatened 
to Dismiss the Heart of the Players’ Case, NFL CONCUSSION LITIG. (Sept. 3, 
2013), http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?p=1508. 
84 Id. 
85 Attorney Paul Anderson expressed his extreme dissatisfaction with the 
settlement—and no longer able to refrain from taking an active role in 
concussion litigation—wrote that while the deal may be adequate for former 
players currently suffering the worst symptoms, the settlement “falls well short 
for the thousands of other players that are on the borderline.” Paul D. 
Anderson Consulting, LLC, The Fight Must Go On, NFL CONCUSSION LITIG. 
(Dec. 3, 2013), http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?p=1548. Anderson filed a 
concussion lawsuit against the Kansas City Chiefs on December 3, 2013. Id.  
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(“LMRA” or the “Taft-Harley Act”) would preempt their claims 
against the NFL. In its memorandum in support of their motion to 
dismiss dated August 30, 2012, the NFL focused on preemption 
and section 301 of the LMRA.86 This section has been interpreted 
to preempt all state law claims “the resolution of which is 
substantially dependent upon or inextricably intertwined with the 
interpretation of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, 
or that arise under the collective bargaining agreement.”87 The 
NFL argued that the plaintiffs’ tort claims required the 
interpretation of several terms in the CBA,88 and therefore, any 
adjudication must take place pursuant to the CBA’s agreed-upon 
grievance procedures. This would require arbitration, and thus 
dismissal from federal court.89 
Under section 301 of the LMRA, federal law governs any 
lawsuit concerning a violation of a contract between an employer 
and a labor organization (here, the NFLPA).90 Because it would 
be an excessive burden to require bargaining parties to reach an 
agreement that complies with the laws of all fifty states, section 
301 seeks to ensure “uniform interpretation” of bargaining 
agreements through the use of federal law.91 As Justice William 
                                                          
86 Memorandum of Law of Defendants National Football League and NFL 
Properties LLC in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Amended Master 
Administrative Long-Form Complaint on Preemption Grounds at 14, In re 
NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 2d 708 (E.D. Pa. 2014), 
2012 WL 3890252 [hereinafter Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss]. Section 301 is 
codified as 29 U.S.C. §185(a) (2012).   
87 Id. See also Lingle v. Norge Div. Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 
(1988); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209–10 (1985).  
88 The NFL specifically referred to a number of CBA provisions it felt 
required interpretation, including medical care provisions “relating to 
assessment, diagnosis, and treatment of player injuries,” player rights and 
obligations provisions including the ability to choose surgeons and obtain 
second opinions, rule-making and player safety provisions in order to help 
make the sport safer, and provisions discussing player benefits and grievance 
procedures.  Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 86, at 12–15. 
89 Id. at 14. 
90 29 U.S.C. §185(a). 
91 Nicole M. DeMuro, Reestablishing the Role of Arbitration in Labor 
Law: Avoiding the Perils of Williams with the Rationale of Pyett, 21 SETON 
HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 467, 474 (2011). 
2014.05.19 GUCCIONE.DOCX 5/19/2014  11:29 AM 
 MOVING PAST A “POCKET CHANGE” SETTLEMENT 927 
Douglas made clear in Textile Workers Union of America v. 
Lincoln Mills of Alabama, the purpose of section 301 was not 
only to give federal courts jurisdiction over labor disputes, but to 
evidence “a federal policy that federal courts should enforce 
[collective bargaining] agreements . . . and that industrial peace 
can best be obtained only in that way.”92 Should bargaining 
parties agree to a dispute resolution provision in their CBA, 
Congress intended it to be enforced: “Final adjustment by a 
method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable 
method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the 
application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining 
agreement.”93  
Therefore, if resolution of a state law claim is “substantially 
dependent upon analysis of the terms” of a labor contract between 
the parties, it is preempted by federal law and may be dismissed 
pursuant to the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.94 Hence, 
if plaintiffs’ dispute is “dependent on” or “intertwined with” the 
NFL-NFLPA CBA’s provisions, it will be adjudicated pursuant 
to the CBA, which compels arbitration.95 Resolution through 
arbitration gives the NFL a distinct advantage: while plaintiffs in 
employment disputes succeed in thirty-six percent of federal court 
cases, only twenty-five percent of such plaintiffs succeed through 
arbitration, with the average award being less than eighteen 
percent of what prevailing receive on average from federal 
courts.96 Arbitration also requires adjudication pursuant to 
                                                          
92 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957). 
93 29 U.S.C. §173 (2012). 
94 Eric C. Surette et al., General Rule of Federal Preemption—“Section 
301” Claims Under Labor Management Relations Act, 41 CAL. JUR. 3D 
LABOR § 319 (2014) (citing Haney v. Aramark Unif. Servs., Inc., 17 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 336 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); see also Dep’t of Fair Emp’t & Hous. v. 
Verizon Cal., Inc.,133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); Lujan v. 
Southern California Gas Co., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)). 
95 See generally 2011 NFL-NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. 
43. 
96 See Robert M. Sagerian, A Penalty Flag for Preemption: The NFL 
Concussion Litigation, Tortious Fraud, and the Steel Curtain Defense of 
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 35 T. JEFFERSON L. 
REV. 229, 264 (2013). 
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contract law, rather than tort law, making punitive damages (to 
disincentivize the NFL from engaging in such conduct in the 
future) unavailable.97 Finally, unlike a public trial, arbitration 
pursuant to the NFL-NFLPA CBA must be confidential, 
preventing the public from learning the specifics of the 
proceeding.98 
Before agreeing to settle, the plaintiffs were justifiably 
concerned that their claims would be preempted. A news report 
released on September 1, 2013, prior to the settlement agreement, 
claimed presiding Judge Anita Brody “signaled” that she would 
accept some part of the NFL’s preemption argument, and that the 
“bulk” of the players’ case would be dismissed.99 In addition, the 
NFL and its teams have often successfully argued for LMRA 
preemption in the past.100 For example, in Givens v. Tennessee 
Football Inc., former player David L. Givens sued his former 
team, the Tennessee Titans, alleging bad faith in performing 
contractual obligations, negligence, and outrageous conduct for 
withholding important medical information regarding Given’s 
knee.101 Ultimately, the Tennessee Titans successfully argued for 
preemption, since Article XLIV of the CBA required team 
physicians to advise a player of any conditions that could affect 
their health or performance.102  
In addition, in Stringer v. NFL, the court found the plaintiff’s 
wrongful death claim was preempted after her husband, Pro Bowl 
lineman Korey Stringer, died of heat stroke during training 
camp.103 Although the court held that the plaintiff’s claim did not 
                                                          
97 Id. at 264–65. 
98 Id. at 265–66. 
99 Fainaru & Fainaru-Wada, supra note 22. 
100 See Paul D. Anderson Consulting, LLC, The Almighty CBA, NFL 
CONCUSSION LITIG. (Aug. 30, 2012), http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?p= 
1080; see also Stringer v. Nat’l Football League, 474 F. Supp. 2d 894 (S.D. 
Ohio 2007) (holding the plaintiff widow’s wrongful death claim, where 
plaintiff’s husband died from heat stroke, was preempted by section XLIV of 
the CBA). 
101 684 F. Supp. 2d 985, 988 (M.D. Tenn. 2010). 
102 Id. at 990.   
103 474 F. Supp. 2d 894, 915 (S.D. Ohio 2007). 
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arise out of the CBA (which made no mention of preventing or 
treating heat-related illnesses),104 the court did find that resolving 
her claim was “substantially dependent” on the interpretation of 
CBA Article XLIV’s team trainer and physician regulations.105 
The plaintiffs in the current NFL lawsuit, to avoid 
preemption, argued that the NFL owed them a duty of care 
completely independent from the CBA.106 First, plaintiffs argued 
that the NFL assumed the duty to act as a guardian of player 
safety since the NFL’s inception in the 1920s, decades before the 
first CBA.107 Additionally, the plaintiffs asserted that because the 
CBA provisions cited by the League make no mention of the NFL 
itself, “the duties they impose on teams are legally irrelevant to 
the NFL’s separate duty to safeguard players from neurological 
injuries.”108 Second, the plaintiffs argued that the NFL assumed a 
duty of care based on its “unrivaled access to neurological-injury 
data,” and its voluntary creation of a committee to “opine on the 
risks of brain injuries in football.”109 
 
B. The Failures of the Mild Traumatic Brain Injury 
Committee 
 
The “committee” the plaintiffs referred to was the Mild 
Traumatic Brain Injury Committee (“MTBIC”). The League 
formed the MTBIC in 1994 to study the effects of concussions 
and brain injury in football.110 Dr. Elliot Pellman, a former New 
York Jets team doctor and rheumatologist, was appointed chair of 
the panel despite little experience in neurology (Pellman was not 
                                                          
104 Id.  
105 Id. at 906, 911, 915. 
106 Surreply of Plaintiffs in Response to Defendants National Football 
League’s and NFL Properties LLC’s Reply Memorandum of Law in Further 
Support of Motion to Dismiss the Amended Master Administrative Long-Form 
Complaint at 1, In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 2d 




110 Barrett, supra note 21.  
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a neurologist) or the type of brain injuries at issue.111 He 
remained chairman until he resigned in 2007,112 in large part 
because of increasing controversy and negative press about his 
tenure as chairman, including his troubling lack of expertise and 
support of incorrect and misleading research that he conducted 
and disseminated during his tenure.113  
The details of Dr. Pellman’s incompetence and deception 
border on the absurd. The New York Times reported that 
Pellman had “exaggerated several aspects of his medical 
education and professional status.”114 For example, Dr. Pellman 
maintained he received his medical degree from SUNY Stony 
Brook, when in reality he attended a school in Guadalajara, 
Mexico.115 Further, Pellman claimed he was an associate clinical 
professor, but was actually a non-teaching assistant.116 He also 
purported to be a fellow of the American College of Physicians, 
though he had not held the title for over six years.117 In addition 
to questionable credentials, Dr. Pellman displayed questionable 
judgment. It was, in the eyes of many experts and critics, very 
troubling that the individual entrusted with the serious task of 
studying mild traumatic brain injuries in order to ensure player 
safety was attributed the following quote: “Concussions are part 
of the profession, an occupational risk. [A football player is] like 
a steelworker who goes up 100 stories, or a soldier.”118 Dr. 
Pellman garnered little respect amongst his colleagues: “When 
neuropsychologists sit around telling jokes, we call him ‘Mr. 
                                                          
111 Patrick Hruby, The Wrong Man for the Job, SPORTS ON EARTH (May 
16, 2013), http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/47668524/.  
112 Id. 
113 Alan Schwartz, N.F.L. Doctor Quits Amid Research Doubt, N.Y. 






118 Michael Farber, The Worst Case, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Dec. 19, 
1994), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1006087/2/ 
index.htm. 
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Pellman.’”119 Another colleague told a reporter “I would hear him 
say things in speeches like, ‘I don’t know much about 
concussions, I learn from my players . . . .’”120 
In addition, the scientific findings of MTBIC under Dr. 
Pellman baffled many and garnered much criticism. In evaluating 
numerous studies linking concussions to serious long-term harm, 
“Pellman’s committee . . . repeatedly questioned and disagreed 
with the findings of researchers who didn’t come from their own 
injury group.”121 In compiling their own research, Dr. Pellman’s 
studies “didn’t include results from hundreds of NFL players.”122 
A troubling 2006 MTBIC study asserted: 
[M]any NFL players can be safely allowed to 
return to play on the day of the injury after 
sustaining a mild [traumatic brain injury]. [T]here 
were no adverse effects, and the results once again 
are in sharp contrast to the recommendations in 
published guidelines and the standard of practice of 
most college and high school football team 
physicians.123  
In the words of an anonymous scientist who reviewed the 
Committee’s work,  
[t]hey’re basically trying to prepare a defense for 
when one of these players sues . . . . They are 
trying to say that what’s done in the NFL is okay 
because in their studies, it doesn’t look like bad 
things are happening from concussions. But the 
studies are flawed beyond belief.124  
After Dr. Pellman’s resignation, the NFL recast the MTBIC 
as its “Head, Neck, and Spine Medical Committee” in 2010.125 
                                                          
119 Peter Keating, Doctor Yes, ESPN (Nov. 6, 2006), http://espn.go.com/ 
nfl/story/_/id/9793720/elliot-pellman-says-okay-play-nfl-suffering-concussion. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. (internal quotations marks omitted). 
122 Id. 
123 Elliot J. Pellman & David C. Viano, Concussion in Professional 
Football, 21 NEROSURGICAL FOCUS 1, 10 (2006). 
124 Keating, supra note 119. 
125 National Football League, NFL Names New Co-Chairs of Head, Neck 
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The new members of this group, now headed by two 
neurosurgeons, sought to distance themselves from Dr. Pellman’s 
research. These new members made it very clear that “they 
would not use any of the old committee’s data or ongoing studies 
on helmets and retired players’ cognitive decline—all of which 
had been overseen by Dr. Pellman and blasted by Congress as 
‘infected’—because they didn’t want their ‘professional 
reputations damaged,’” given the studies’ widely reported 
inaccuracies.126 
 
C. The NFL’s Arguments 
 
The MTBIC’s failures, while appalling, now provide the basis 
for the plaintiffs’ strongest argument against section 301 
preemption. The plaintiffs’ counsel in the current NFL action 
argue that the duty to prevent concussions and related brain 
injuries is completely separate from the CBA. While the CBA 
regulates a number of “health-related duties” associated with 
NFL teams and team doctors, the plaintiffs argued that the CBA 
does not impose any such duties on the NFL itself.127 Instead, 
these duties are wholly independent of the CBA, and arose 
voluntarily through the League’s creation of the MTBIC, its 
involvement in concussion research, and its long history of 
providing for player safety through rule changes and equipment 
requirements in order to prevent injuries.128 
However, the NFL maintained its stance that the CBA 
preempted the plaintiffs’ claims, positing that CBA terms that 
facially constrained only individual teams, actually applied to the 
“League” itself as well. The NFL argued the plaintiffs could not 
escape preemption by trying to make an “artificial” distinction 
                                                          
& Spine Medical Committee (Mar. 16, 2010, 4:21 PM), http://www.nfl.com/ 
news/story/09000d5d816fbbea/article/nfl-names-new-cochairs-of-head-neck-
spine-medical-committee. 
126 Hruby, supra note 111. 
127 Plaintiffs’ Surreply, supra note 106, at 7. 
128 The plaintiffs referenced, for example, the League’s making helmets 
mandatory in 1943, and making it illegal to strike at an opponent’s head, neck, 
or face in 1980. Plaintiffs’ Master Complaint, supra note 3, at 14–19. 
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between the NFL and its member clubs, as the NFL is simply an 
“unincorporated association of 32 member clubs,” engaging in a 
“joint enterprise” to organize and promote professional 
football.”129 Essentially, the NFL argued that because the teams 
and the larger league are essentially the same entity, CBA terms 
that explicitly constrain only NFL teams are still applied to the 
NFL as well, and are therefore not independent of the agreement.  
The NFL also pointed to a number of CBA provisions it 
believes preempted the former players’ claims.130 These included 
several rule-making and safety provisions. For example, Article 
50, section 1(a) of the 2011 CBA requires the maintenance of a 
“Joint Committee on Player Safety and Welfare.”131 This Joint 
Committee is tasked with discussing “player safety and welfare 
relating to equipment, playing surfaces, stadium facilities, playing 
rules, and more.”132 The NFL also referenced the CBA’s 
grievance procedures—including a broad arbitration clause 
requiring mediation of “all disputes involving the ‘interpretation 
of, application of, or compliance with, any provision of’ the 
CBA’s, player contracts, or any applicable provision of the 
[League] Constitution.”133According to the NFL, the plaintiffs’ 
negligence, fraud, and misrepresentation claims “bear directly on 
issues addressed by the CBA’s health and safety provisions,” 
though such provisions do not mention concussions or brain 
injuries explicitly.134 Therefore, the NFL argued that the 
plaintiff’s claims should be preempted by federal law and 
arbitrated. 
The NFL referenced several key cases to support its 
                                                          
129 Reply Memorandum of Law of Defendants National Football League 
and NFL Properties LLC in Further Support of Motion to Dismiss the 
Amended Master Administrative Long-Form Complaint on Preemption 
Grounds at 9–10, In re NFL Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 
2d 708 (E.D. Pa. 2014) [hereinafter Defendants’ Reply Memorandum]. 
130 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 86, at 7–8.  
131 Id. at 9.   
132 Id.   
133  Id. at 10. This specific provision can be found at Article 50, §1(a) of 
the 2011 CBA.  
134 Id. at 16.   
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preemption claims under section 301. In these lawsuits, courts 
consistently held that the CBA preempted the plaintiffs’ claims. 
In Duerson v. National Football League, Inc., the estate of 
former Chicago Bears safety, David Duerson, brought a wrongful 
death suit against the NFL.135 The plaintiff alleged that Duerson 
committed suicide as a result of brain damage he sustained during 
his playing career.136 In Duerson, the court held that the CBA 
preempted the estate’s negligence claims.137 The court explained 
that Article XLIV, section 1 of the 1993 CBA required club 
physicians to advise players if their condition “could be 
significantly aggravated by continued performance.”138 The court 
explained that resolving the plaintiff’s claim required a 
determination of whether the club, by allowing Duerson to return 
to the field, “significantly aggravated” his injuries.139 Therefore, 
the plaintiff’s claims were “substantially dependent” on the 
interpretation of Article XLIV, implicating LMRA section 301 
and requiring federal jurisdiction.140 The court additionally 
hypothesized that other CBA provisions addressing player safety 
may create a general “duty on the NFL’s clubs to monitor a 
player’s health and fitness to continue to play football,” a duty 
more than broad enough to include the plaintiff’s claims in 
Duerson.141 The court further noted “preemption is still possible 
even if the duty on which the claim is based arises independently 
of the CBA, so long as resolution of the claim requires 
                                                          
135 No. 12 C 2513, 2012 WL 1658353 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2012). 
136 Id. at *1. Duerson suffered from the effects of CTE, including 
“intense headaches, lack of short term memory, language difficulties, vision 
trouble, and problems with impulse control.”  Id.  The plaintiff’s complaint 
alleged counts of negligence, fraudulent concealment, conspiracy to publish 
false information, and negligent failure to warn, against the NFL. Id. 
137 Id. at *4. 
138  Id. 
139 Id. (citation omitted). 
140 Id. at *6. 
141 Id. Such provisions include those requiring each team to have a board-
certified orthopedic surgeon, requiring that the NFL pay for any medical care 
rendered by club staff, and provisions regarding certification requirements for 
trainers. Id.  
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interpretation of the CBA.”142 
The NFL also cited to the aforementioned decision in Stringer 
v. National Football League.143 In Stringer, the widow of Korey 
Stringer, a former Minnesota Vikings offensive lineman, filed a 
five-count complaint against the League after Stringer died due to 
complications from heat stroke and exhaustion.144 The plaintiff 
argued that the NFL had no contractual duty to protect players 
from heat-related illnesses, and that while individual teams were 
responsible for their players’ health and safety, the NFL 
voluntarily assumed the duty to “provide complete, current, and 
competent information and directions to NFL athletic trainers, 
physicians, and coaches about heat-related illnesses.”145 This duty 
was assumed, Stringer argued, when the League issued a set of 
“Hot Weather Guidelines” for the protection of players.146 
Although the court agreed that the wrongful death claim did not 
arise under the CBA, it accepted the NFL’s argument that the 
CBA preempted Stringer’s wrongful death claim because 
resolution of the claim was still “substantially dependent” on the 
CBA.147 The district court found that “the degree of care owed by 
the NFL in republishing the Hot Weather Guidelines . . . and 
what was reasonable under the circumstances, must be considered 
in light of pre-existing contractual duties imposed by the CBA on 
the individual NFL clubs concerning the general health and safety 
of the NFL players.”148 In deciding that Stringer’s claims were 
“inextricably intertwined” with the CBA,149 the majority noted a 
                                                          
142 Id. 
143 Id. at *5 (citing Stringer v. Nat’l Football League, 474 F. Supp. 2d 
894 (S.D. Ohio 2007)). 
144  Stringer, 474 F. Supp. at 898. 
145 Id. at 905. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 908–09. More specifically, the court found the plaintiff’s claim 
implicated CBA Art. XLIV §2, requiring the certification of training staff, 
including instruction on how to “to prevent, recognize, and treat heat-related 
illness, id. at 910., and Art. XLIV §1, requiring team physicians to inform 
players if their physical condition “will be ‘significantly aggravated by 
continued performance,’” id.  
148 Id. at 910. 
149 Id. at 908–09.  
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CBA provision requiring team trainers to be “certified by the 
National Athletic Trainers Association.”150 Since the “degree of 
care” that the NFL owed by republishing the Hot Weather 
Guidelines was dependent on whether or not team trainers were 
educated on treating heat-related illnesses as part of the 
certification process, the court decided the CBA must be 
interpreted, and the plaintiff’s claims preempted. 
The NFL also relied on Williams v. National Football 
League, in which several players, including the plaintiffs, tested 
positive for the banned diuretic bumetanide.151 The players, who 
all testified they took StarCaps diet pills in order to control their 
weight, also stated that they did not know the supplement 
contained the banned diuretic.152 Plaintiffs argued that despite 
warnings about supplements, a hotline that provided banned 
substance information, and the League’s strict liability policy on 
banned substances—the NFL owed a duty to the plaintiffs because 
the NFL and its drug policy administrator knew StarCaps 
contained bumetanide, yet failed to disclose it.153 Failure to advise 
players of this fact, the plaintiffs argued, constituted a breach of 
the League’s fiduciary duty to its players.154 Plaintiffs also 
brought claims for negligence, gross negligence, and 
misrepresentation against the League.  
However, the court held that the CBA preempted each of the 
players’ claims. Even though the players alleged that the duty to 
provide “an ingredient-specific warning for StarCaps” arose not 
under the CBA, but under Minnesota law, the court held that 
whether the NFL owed this duty to the players “[could] not be 
determined without examining the parties’ legal relationship and 
expectations as established by the CBA . . . .”155 Further, the 
court held that the CBA preempted plaintiffs’ misrepresentation 
                                                          
150 Id. at 910. The court also referenced Article XLIV, section 1, (the 
provision at issue in Duerson) requiring team physicians to advise athletes if a 
further game action would “significantly aggravate” the player’s injuries.  
151 582 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2009). 
152 Id. at 871. 
153 Id.  
154 Id. at 872. 
155 Id. at 881. 
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claims because “the question of whether the Players [could] show 
that they reasonably relied on the lack of a warning that StarCaps 
contained bumetanide cannot be ascertained apart from the terms 
of the [League’s drug policy].”156 Finally, the court held that the 
CBA also preempted plaintiffs’ claims for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, because determining whether the NFL 
engaged in “outrageous” conduct required an evaluation of the 
League’s drug policy, a part of the CBA.157 
 
D. The Plaintiffs’ Arguments 
 
The plaintiffs and the NFL differed substantially in their 
interpretations of these key cases. In arguing their claims 
shouldn’t be dismissed, the plaintiffs attempted to distinguish the 
NFL’s precedent cases, including Duerson, Stringer, and 
Williams.158 For example, the plaintiffs pointed to a key 
difference between their lawsuit and Duerson. They argued that 
unlike their own claims, the estate in Duerson never alleged that 
the NFL, as a whole, assumed a duty of care independent from 
that of the clubs and team doctors governed by the CBA.159 In 
Duerson, the plaintiff barely referenced any duty assumed by the 
League itself, only referring to a “generic duty ‘to keep [players] 
reasonably safe.’”160 The current plaintiffs also highlighted the 
NFL’s evasion of what the plaintiffs considered the “fundamental 
flaw” of Duerson: that the court merely speculated that CBA 
provisions might permit the League to exercise a lower standard 
of care, without ever identifying an “actual dispute” over a CBA 
term.161 
The plaintiffs also attempted to distinguish the present case 
from Stringer. First, they argued that unlike the present litigation, 
the plaintiff in Stringer did not allege that the NFL misled 
athletes, making that case inapplicable to the player’s fraud 
                                                          
156 Id. at 882. 
157 Id. 
158 Plaintiffs’ Surreply, supra note 106, at 20–25. 
159 Id. at 1. 
160 Id. at 21. 
161 Id. at 22–23 (emphasis added). 
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claims here.162 Second, the plaintiff in Stringer alleged (arguably 
to her detriment) that “[a]thletic trainers in the NFL serve as the 
first line of treatment for players. It is their initial responsibility 
to recognize and treat football-related injuries or conditions, 
including heat-related illness.”163 Therefore, preemption was only 
required in Stringer because Stringer’s claims referred 
specifically to a breach of duty by team trainers, implicating the 
CBA, which explicitly governs team medical staff.164 By contrast, 
the plaintiffs argued, their concussion litigation sought to 
establish a duty wholly independent from that of team medical 
personnel.165 Therefore, no interpretation of the CBA would be 
necessary to resolve their claims. 
The concussion plaintiffs distinguished Williams based on 
divergent facts. Their attorneys focused on the difference between 
the “voluntary assumption of duty” on the part of the NFL and 
the assumption at issue in the concussion litigation.166 As 
previously mentioned,167 the current plaintiffs asserted that the 
NFL assumed a duty of care to protect athletes from brain trauma 
harm, arising from its historical assumption of duty for player 
care and safety, and the NFL’s formation of the MTBIC in 
1994.168 By contrast, in Williams, “the challenged steroid testing 
regime was set forth in a comprehensive written ‘Policy’ that the 
CBA ‘expressly incorporate[d].’”169 Because the NFL’s drug 
policy was therefore part of the CBA, the CBA was obviously 
implicated in resolving the plaintiffs’ claims, and preemption was 
proper. In the present case, by contrast, the plaintiffs argued that 
“the NFL identifie[d] no written policy specifically governing 
head injuries, and certainly not one assigning responsibility for 
                                                          
162 Id. at 23. 
163 474 F. Supp. 2d 894, 910 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
164 Plaintiffs’ Surreply, supra note 106, at 23. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at 24. 
167 See supra text accompanying notes 106–09. 
168 Plaintiffs’ Surreply, supra note 106, at 6. 
169 Id. at 24. 
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those injuries to the NFL.”170  
The NFL addressed many of the plaintiffs’ arguments,171 but 
not what attorney Paul Anderson considered “the strongest theory 
in the plaintiffs’ case”—that the creation of the MTBIC 
Committee, to “spearhead concussion research,” represented an 
independent assumption of duty by the NFL.172 Reviewing Third 
Circuit precedent, Anderson concluded that the NFL did create 
an independent duty through creation of the Committee, and 
therefore, “the case law should have foreclosed the dismissal of 
all negligence and fraud-based claims that relied upon the 
[MTBIC’s] conduct.”173 Referencing the news report that Judge 
Brody threatened to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims on preemption 
grounds, Anderson asserted that such a decision would be “an 
unpredictable shocker,” and hypothesized that the rumor’s source 
might have been “jockeying for a settlement in an attempt to 
counter the public’s perception that this deal was lousy.”174 
Federal precedent supports Anderson’s position: that the 
plaintiffs’ claims cannot be preempted by the CBA since the NFL 
assumed a duty of care through the MTBIC. In Trans Penn Wax 
Corp. v. McCandless, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
held that section 301 of the LMRA did not preempt the plaintiff’s 
claims.175 The plaintiffs, former employees of Trans Penn, were 
given a written “contract” (separate from the parties’ CBA) by 
their employer guaranteeing their jobs, but were subsequently 
fired less than a year later.176 The court held that the plaintiff’s 
claims were not preempted because they never alleged a violation 
of duties assumed specifically in the CBA.177 The court reached 
the same conclusion in Kline v. Security Guards, Inc.,178 noting 
that the fact that the CBA was simply related to the plaintiff’s 
                                                          
170 Id. at 25. 
171 Defendants’ Reply Memorandum, supra note 129, at 15–18.  
172 Paul D. Anderson Consulting, supra note 83. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 50 F.3d 217, 233 (3d Cir. 1995). 
176 Id. at 221. 
177 Id. at 232. 
178 386 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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claims was not sufficient for the court to find preemption.179 
There, the plaintiff employees alleged their employer’s 
surveillance practices, including the use of microphones to record 
oral communications, amounted to several torts including 
invasion of privacy.180 Judge Stapleton asserted that “the mere 
fact that we must look at the CBA in order to determine that it is 
silent on any issue relevant to Appellants’ state claims does not 
mean that we have ‘interpreted’ the CBA” for Section 301 
purposes.181 Noting that the CBA did not mention the terms at 
issue (e.g., “surveillance,” “video cameras,” or “microphones”), 
the court found that no “interpretation” of the CBA was 
necessary to adjudicate plaintiffs’ claims.182 
On May 14, 2014, the In re National Football League 
Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation plaintiffs received welcome 
news that at least one District Court judge accepted similar 
arguments against section 301 preemption.183 Judge Catherine D. 
Perry remanded Green, et al. v. Arizona Cardinals Football 
Club, LLC, a suit brought by three former players (and their 
spouses) against their former team, to state court, finding that 
“the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims can be evaluated without 
interpreting [the 1977 or 1982 CBAs]….”184 Judge Perry found 
the bargaining agreements did not bear on negligence claims 
“premised upon the common law duties to maintain a safe 
working environment, not to expose employees to unreasonable 
risks of harm, and to warn employees about the existence of 
dangers of which they could not reasonably be expected to be 
aware.”185 Similarly, Judge Perry noted that the players’ negligent 
                                                          
179 Id. at 256. 
180 Id. at 250. The employer alleged these claims were preempted by CBA 
clauses relating to “management rights” and “shop rules.” Id. at 257. 
181 Id. at 256. 
182 Id. at 259. 
183 Paul D. Anderson Consulting, LLC, Court Rejects NFL Team’s 
Preemption Argument, NFL CONCUSSION LITIG. (May 14, 2014), 
http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?p=1635. 
184 Green v. Ariz. Cardinals Football Club, LLC, No. 4:14-cv-00461-
CDP, 2014 WL 1920468, at *1–2 (E.D. Mo. May 14, 2014). 
185 Id. at *10. 
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misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment claims could be 
resolved without CBA interpretation, as they arose from common 
law duties of an employer “‘to inform himself of those matters of 
scientific knowledge’ that relate to the hazards of his business, 
and relay that knowledge to his employees.”186 Judge Perry’s 
decision may have enormous effects on the future of In re 
National Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation. 
As one journalist noted, “[t]he outcome [of Green] also could 
result in the plaintiffs in the settled case to quit trying to persuade 
Judge Anita Brody to approve the settlement, opting instead to 
proceed with the litigation. If the players in that case secure the 
same victory Roy Green and others have realized in Missouri, the 
value of the claims would potentially skyrocket.”187 
Since the NFL has assumed a general duty to protect its 
athletes, and more specifically a duty to warn them of the risks of 
neurological injury (through its formation of the MTBIC), the 
plaintiffs’ claims should not be preempted. As in Kline, the NFL-
NFLPA CBA makes no mention of the specific duty at issue. Just 
as terms like “surveillance” or “microphones” were not 
mentioned in the Kline CBA, discussion of concussions or brain 
injuries do not appear in the NFL-NFLPA CBA with any 
reference to the NFL itself, only to issues relating to team 
doctors.188 Though the plaintiff’s claims in Stringer openly arose 
out of team duties to their athletes, the plaintiffs here look to the 
NFL itself. While the players’ claims may relate to the CBA 
terms the NFL highlighted (such as the creation of the Joint 
Committee on Player Safety and Welfare), such terms do not 
require interpretation to resolve the claims. This distinguishes the 
present litigation from Williams, where the drug policy at issue 
was expressly incorporated into the collective bargaining 
agreement. The CBA’s arbitration clause only applies to disputes 
                                                          
186 Id. at *16. 
187 Mike Florio, NFL Suffers Major Setback in Concussion Cases, NBC 
PROFOOTBALLTALK (May 14, 2014, 9:28 PM), http://profootballtalk. 
nbcsports.com/2014/05/14/nfl-suffers-major-setback-in-concussion-case/. 
188 See generally NFL-NFL Player’s Assoc. Collective Bargaining 
Agreement (Aug. 4, 2011), available at https://www.nflplayers.com/About-
us/CBA-Download/. 
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involving the CBA, player contracts, and the League 
Constitution. And as in Trans Penn Wax Corp., none of the 
plaintiffs’ claims refer to explicit duties in the bargaining 
agreement. None of the CBA clauses proffered by the NFL189 
relate specifically to a League concussion policy. Therefore, 
LMRA section 301 should not apply.  
 
IV. PROVING CAUSATION AND THE LOSS OF CHANCE DOCTRINE 
 
A. Causation Issues: Tobacco Litigation, Team Trainers, 
Assumption of Risk and Contributory Negligence 
 
Even if concussion litigation plaintiffs avoid preemption, they 
must still prove causation in order to successfully prove 
negligence. This requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that the “head 
[injuries] players sustained while playing in the NFL” directly 
caused the plaintiffs’ current health problems.190 It may be 
extremely difficult for plaintiffs to show that the game of 
professional football caused long-term cognitive injuries, 
especially where high school or collegiate-level athletics, non-
football activities, genetics, and diet also play a large role in the 
incidence of these diseases.191 
In order to prove causation, some scholars have drawn 
parallels between the concussion litigation and big-tobacco 
lawsuits.192 Both the NFL and the tobacco industry sought to 
                                                          
189 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 86, at 7–9.   
190 Scott Fujita, Mixed Feelings Over NFL Concussion Settlement, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/03/sports/ 
football/mixed-feelings-over-nfl-concussions-settlement.html. 
191 Michael McCann, Examining What Happens Next in the Concussion 
Lawsuit Settlement, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 29, 2013), 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/nfl/news/20130829/what-happens-next-in-nfl-
concussion-lawsuit-settlement/. 
192 This idea gained traction after a 2009 congressional hearing was 
conducted to evaluate the League’s concussion policy. There, Representative 
Linda Sanchez of California “analogized the denial of a causal link between 
NFL concussions and cognitive decline to the tobacco industry’s denial of the 
link between cigarette consumption and ill health effects.” Joseph Hanna & 
Daniel Kain, The NFL’s Shaky Concussion Policy Exposes the League to 
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discredit growing scientific data indicating a causal link to long-
term illness and formed research committees to “refute the 
mounting evidence load that protected the vitality of their 
products.”193 Despite the attractiveness of using big-tobacco 
litigation as a framework for pursing concussion lawsuits against 
the NFL, some do not believe it is an apt comparison. Attorney 
Joseph Hanna succinctly explained the problem with comparing 
the tobacco litigation and the former players’ concussion claims: 
[U]nlike tobacco use, the effect of individual 
concussions on a football player remains unclear. 
Further, the NFL retains medical personnel who 
are employed specifically to detect and prevent 
player injuries, whereas smoker plaintiffs were 
given no such attention. Lastly, because NFL 
players could have sustained permanent mental 
injuries at any point in their career (high school, 
college, etc.), proving the causal chain—i.e., that 
the NFL’s failure to warn resulted in injury—is 
difficult at best.194 
Although statistical evidence linking concussions to long-term 
disease such as CTE is becoming increasingly overwhelming,195 
                                                          
Potential Liability Headaches, 21 ENT., ARTS & SPORTS L.J., no. 3, 
Fall/Winter 2010, at 33, 34. 
193 Daniel Kain, Note, “It’s Just a Concussion:” The National Football 
League’s Denial of a Causal Link Between Multiple Concussions and Later-
Life Cognitive Decline, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 697, 717–18 (2009). 
194 Joseph M. Hanna, Paying the Piper: NFL’s Concussion Policy Results 
in Huge Class Action Lawsuit, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Aug. 
15, 2012), available at http://www.mosessport.com/Paying_the_Piper_-
_NFL_s_Concussion_Policy_Results_in_Huge_Class_Action_Lawsuit.pdf . 
195 For example, Dr. Ann McKee has studied the brains of at least forty-
six former NFL players has found CTE in forty-five of them. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, when asked to speak about her research in front of the MTBIC 
in 2009, Dr. McKee was allegedly confronted with aggressive questioning and 
mocking interruptions, especially from committee co-chair Ira Casson. 
Transcript, League of Denial: The NFL’s Concussion Crisis, FRONTLINE, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/sports/league-of-denial/transcript-
50/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2014); see also Mark Fainaru-Wada & Steve 
Fainaru, League of Denial, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (October 7, 2013), 
http://sportsillustrated.asia/vault/article/magazine/MAG1208801/index.htm. 
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proving causation would require the NFL to answer questions 
avoided by the proposed settlement; including exactly what the 
NFL knew about the long-term effects of football-related brain 
injuries, when they knew it,196 and whether they deliberately 
spread misinformation or remained willfully blind to the problem. 
Without this information, the NFL cannot be held accountable. 
Fortunately for the plaintiffs, there is already ample evidence that 
the NFL ignored or dismissed mounting evidence linking 
concussions to neurological damage.197 In 1994, NFL 
Commissioner Paul Tagliabue responded to concerns over 
concussions by stating “the number [of concussions] is relatively 
small . . . . [T]he problem is a journalist issue.”198 Further, the 
Pellman-lead MTBIC asserted that “[r]eturn to play does not 
involve a significant risk of a second injury either in the same 
game or during the season,” and argued that individuals “prone 
to delayed or poor recovery after MTBI” are actually “selected 
out” of organized football, and never reach the NFL.199 The NFL 
also rejected the American Academy of Neurology’s 1997 return-
to-play guidelines, including the suggestion that concussed 
players not return to the field until being symptom-free for at 
least a week.200 In addition, MTBIC co-chair Ira Casson’s famous 
2007 “no, no, no” denial when asked about any link between 
football and depression, dementia, Alzheimer’s, or other long-
term problems, further evidences that the League at least turned a 
blind eye to the problem.201 It may be nearly impossible to show 
                                                          
196 See Campbell, supra note 13. 
197 See generally Lauren Ezell, Timeline: The NFL’s Concussion Crisis, 




200 MTBIC doctors criticized the guidelines as not being supported by 
ample research, stating, “[W]e see people all the time that get knocked out 
briefly and have no symptoms.” James C. McKinley Jr., Invisible Injury: A 
Special Report; A Perplexing Foe Takes an Awful Toll, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 
2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/12/sports/invisible-injury-a-special-
report-a-perplexing-foe-takes-an-awful-toll.html. 
201 Bernard Goldberg conducted the interview in 2007. REAL SPORTS 
WITH BRYANT GUMBEL (HBO May 14, 2007). Ira Casson – No, No, No, 
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that the NFL alone caused the plaintiffs’ injuries, but mounting 
evidence suggests that it did spread misinformation, failed to 
disclosure unpopular data, and relied on poor science. This, when 
coupled with the NFL’s strong denial of any causal links between 
playing football and long-term brain injuries, indicates that the 
NFL prevented players from making informed decisions about 
their heath and contributed to the prevalence of such harm.   
Importantly, the fact that NFL teams retain physicians does 
not mean that the League is not responsible for plaintiff’s 
injuries. While NFL teams do retain medical personnel “to detect 
and prevent player injury,” the physicians’ efforts do not 
preclude a finding that the League caused the litigation plaintiffs’ 
injuries, due to the doctors’ inherent conflicts of interest.202 This 
conflict of interest exists because both trainers and doctors are 
paid by team management and thus they face pressure to return 
athletes to the field as soon as possible, hoping to keep their 
employer happy and retain their title as an “official” team 
medical provider or physician group.203 Although the NFL added 
independent neurological consultants to the sidelines in 2013,204 
this does not solve all the problems associated with concussion 
diagnoses, and obviously does little to help the retired players 
comprising the plaintiffs in the current lawsuit. Some players do 
not show immediate symptoms, making an on-scene neurologist 
ineffective.205 Also, typical sideline chaos can cause a breakdown 
in protocol, and players tend to refuse to leave the game.206 
Evidence, therefore, suggests that team trainers and physicians 
                                                          
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R4NbU_HaB3Y (last visited 
May 3, 2014). 
202 Kain, supra note 188, at 728–29. 
203 Id. at 708–09. 
204 Curtis Crabtree, NFL Will Have Independent Neurological Consultants 
on Sidelines Next Season, NBC PROFOOTBALLTALK (Jan. 31, 2013,  
4:10 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2013/01/31/nfl-will-have-
independent-neurological-consultants-on-sidelines-next-season/. 
205 Dom Cosentino, Why the NFL’s New Concussion Protocols Aren’t 
Working, DEADSPIN (Oct. 3, 2013, 11:40 AM), http://deadspin.com/why-the-
nfls-new-concussion-protocols-arent-working-1437228632. 
206 Id. 
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were not particularly effective at handling and treating injuries 
arising from concessions. 
Two of the most potent defenses that the NFL would likely 
raise are assumption of risk and contributory negligence.207 Such 
defenses arise out of the belief that many football players, despite 
knowing that they risk injury or further injury, still “tough it out” 
on the field and fail to be honest with their team’s trainers and 
physicians. However, it is not clear that the NFL would be 
successful. In order to raise assumption of risk as a defense, the 
plaintiffs must, “knowing . . . the risk and appreciating its 
quality, voluntarily [choose] to confront it.”208 If plaintiffs 
voluntarily place themselves in harm’s way, despite the risks, 
they cannot later claim negligence if they are injured. Given the 
deliberate misinformation provided by the MTBIC, and the 
potential existence of data and information allegedly withheld by 
the NFL, proving athletes had “actual knowledge” of the risks 
that arose from concussions would be difficult to prove.209 In 
other words, while it is reasonable to argue that football players 
assume the risk of being concussed, it will be challenging for the 
NFL to argue players actually knew how these concussions would 
ultimately affect them, even if a substantial number of athletes 
may have tried to play through their injury regardless. 
Contributory negligence may provide a better defense for the 
League.210 In 2007, the NFL distributed a pamphlet to players 
giving players the burden of notifying team doctors and trainers 
of possible concussion symptoms, and advising that players 
should not return until they are entirely free of symptoms.211 
However, it appears that many players have ignored this advice, 
likely contributing to their risk of long-term injury.212 The NFL 
                                                          
207 See Wong, supra note 20. 
208 Dan B. Dobbs et al., THE LAW OF TORTS §235 (2d ed. 2000). 
209 See Hanna & Kain, supra note 187, at 11. 
210 See id. at 11–12. 
211 See National Football League, NFL Outlines for Players Steps Taken 
to Address Concussions, NFL.COM (Aug. 14, 2007), http://www.nfl.com/ 
news/story/09000d5d8017cc67/article/nfl-outlines-for-players-steps-taken-to-
address-concussions. 
212 See Howard Fendrich, NFL Concussions: Some Players Still Willing 
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has a long history of lauding “toughness” and the ability to play 
through injury, where if a player left a game with a “slight 
concussion,” they weren’t “giving it all” for their team.213 For 
example, quarterback Peyton Manning admitted to intentionally 
underperforming on baseline concussion tests in order to lower 
his return-to-play standards.214 By lowering his baseline, Manning 
hoped to return from concussions earlier than recommended, as 
he might later be able to meet his baseline after an injury, even if 
he were still suffering the concussion’s effects. Though some 
players may not have acted in the best interests of their health, 
this behavior cannot be viewed in a vacuum and should not affect 
the outcome of concussion litigation. It would be difficult for the 
NFL to prove that many of the plaintiffs hid concussive injuries, 
and it is likely that many players concealing brain injuries would 
not have done so absent the League’s deliberately cultivated 
“tough-it-out” culture and frequent minimization of concussion 
risks.  
In addition, there is considerable incentive for NFL players to 
play down their own injuries. NFL contracts are not guaranteed 
beyond the season in which an injury occurs if the player cannot 
pass his team physical before the subsequent season, and football 
players can be terminated at-will if the team decides another 
player would increase team performance.215 In order to keep their 
jobs then, many players do not reveal if they are suffering from 
any concussion symptoms.216 Furthermore, even if players report 
their symptoms, those players are still under significant pressure 
to return before becoming completely asymptomatic in order to 
                                                          




214 Rick Reilley, Talking Football with Archie, Peyton, Eli, ESPN (Apr. 
27, 2011), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/news/story?id=6430211.  
215 Kain, supra note 187, at 710–11. 
216 For example, linebacker Dan Morgan, who had endured a number of 
concussions and missed significant playing time, restructured his contract 
bonus in order to remain on the Carolina Panthers through a calculation based 
on number of games played. Hanna & Kain, supra note 186, at 12. 
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stay in their club and coach’s good graces, and retain their roster 
position.217  
Faced with these systemic issues, and the lack of information 
and misinformation provided by the League to its athletes, it is 
unlikely that the NFL could prove contributory negligence. For 
players entering the NFL today, however, both assumption of 
risk and contributory negligence arguments might bar future 
lawsuits, since much more information is becoming known and 
available to current and future professional football players. 
However, even if the plaintiffs here survive these defenses, 
proving the NFL caused the plaintiffs’ injuries will require some 
creativity, as a wide variety of factors outside of professional 
football contribute to the long-term illnesses at issue. 
 
B. The Loss of Chance Doctrine as a Basis for Proving 
Causation 
 
Outside of the NFL concussion litigation context, proving that 
any one actor caused an illness is extremely difficult. The process 
of evaluating disease causation is “typically multifactorial,” as “a 
large constellation of factors and variables coalesce to produce a 
particular person’s unique set of illness experiences.”218 It is hard 
to find liability where elements such as genetics, upbringing, 
personal habits, and environment all play an indeterminate role in 
causation, in addition to any tortious activity. This issue is even 
more complex for the plaintiffs here, who not only have to prove 
the NFL caused neurological injury, but must separate its 
negative contributions to players’ health from those of other 
levels of football (youth leagues, high school, college, etc.), 
genetic predisposition, previous head trauma from accidents 
unrelated to sports, and abuse of drugs or alcohol.219 
                                                          
217 See Kain, supra note 187, at 711–12. 
218 Daniel S. Goldberg, Mild Traumatic Brain Injury, The National 
League, and the Manufacture of Doubt: An Ethical, Legal, and Historical 
Analysis, 34 J. LEGAL MED. 157, 169 (2013). 
219 See Goldfinger Personal Injury Law, NFL Agrees to Pay $765 Million 
Settlement for Concussion Class Action Law Suit, TORONTO INJURY LAWYER 
BLOG (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.torontoinjurylawyerblog.com/2013/09/nfl-
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In order to prove causation, the plaintiffs’ lawyers had 
intended to use “alternative causation (or ‘multiple-causation’) 
theory.”220 Alternative causation theory extends liability when 
multiple actors are negligent (for example, the NFL, the NCAA, 
and Riddell—the company that manufactures the League’s 
helmets), but only one actually caused the harm, and it is 
impossible to discern which.221 In the seminal case Summers v. 
Tice, two hunters negligently fired their shotguns while hunting 
quail, injuring the plaintiff third hunter.222 Though the court could 
not determine which defendant actually shot the plaintiff, it found 
that both should be found jointly liable.223 Therefore, once the 
negligence of the multiple tortfeasors is established, the burden 
shifts to each defendant to show they did not cause the plaintiff’s 
harm.224 If the defendants cannot meet this burden, both will 
become liable under alternative causation theory, even though one 
negligent actor may have caused no damage at all.225 In justifying 
its decision, the court in Summers noted that defendants typically 
have better access to evidence of the actual cause than plaintiffs, 
and that placing the burden of proof on plaintiffs would leave 
many without remedy.226 Because the “innocent” negligent actor 
made it difficult (or impossible) for the plaintiff to prove 
causation, “the defendants, rather than the innocent plaintiff, 
should bear the loss.”227 
As attorney Paul Anderson hypothesized, plaintiffs using 
alternative causation will argue that while other actors contributed 
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220 Jared Berman, A Look at the NFL Concussion Litigation: Q & A With 
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221 Dobbs et al., supra note 202, §193. 
222 Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). For another application of 
multiple causation theory, see Landers v. E. Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 
248 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. 1952). 
223 Summers, 199 P.2d at 5. 
224 Dobbs et al., supra note 202, §193. 
225 Id. 
226 Summers, 199 P.2d at 4. 
227 Dobbs et al., supra note 202, §193. 
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to the plaintiffs’ harm, “[a]s the industry leader, it is appropriate 
for the NFL to be held jointly and severally liable for 
substantially contributing to the players’ injuries.”228 
Unfortunately, alternative causation remains a tenuous strategy 
with no guarantee of success, and even Anderson admitted that it 
was a “legal stretch.”229 This is in part because successfully 
finding alternative causation liability requires the presence of 
more than one negligent actor. In this case, “proof that one of the 
two actors is negligent simply does not aid the plaintiff at all.”230 
In order for concussion plaintiffs to use this theory successfully, 
they must be able to show that actors other than the NFL were 
also negligent, and in some jurisdictions, must have all tortfeasors 
joined as defendants, or show that each defendant created 
“qualitatively similar risks of harm.”231 
In the alternative, plaintiffs’ counsel may want to argue for an 
extension of the “loss of chance” (or “lost chance”) doctrine.232 
Used almost exclusively in medical malpractice suits, loss of 
chance permits plaintiffs to recover for tortious actions 
substantially reducing their chance of survival, even if that chance 
was less than fifty percent.233 In Herskovits v. Group Health, the 
court found the plaintiff successfully proved causation by showing 
the defendant’s failure to diagnose the plaintiff’s lung cancer 
substantially reduced the plaintiff’s chance of survival, even 
though Herskovits had less than a fifty-percent chance of living 
regardless of when the diagnosis was made.234  
Use of the lost chance doctrine would mitigate the harshness 
of the usual “all or nothing” causation standard,235 and allow 
                                                          
228 Berman, supra note 214 (emphasis in original). 
229 Id. 
230 Dobbs et al., supra note 202, §193.  
231 Id. 
232 Use of the doctrine first arose in the English case, Chaplin v. Hicks, 
[1911] 2 K.B. 786 (Eng.). 
233 J. Stephen Phillips, The “Lost Chance” Theory of Recovery, 27 
COLO. LAW, Nov. 1998, at 85, 85. 
234 664 P.2d 474, 487 (Wash. 1983). 
235 The traditional standard permitted a recovery only upon a 
preponderance of evidence—a fifty-one percent certainty of causation. See 
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concussion plaintiffs to recover damages even if a plaintiff 
endured additional brain trauma outside the scope of their NFL 
employment, such as through college football or a car accident. 
Though loss of chance doctrine has been applied where 
malpractice reduces the plaintiff’s chance of survival (such as a 
missed or late diagnosis), courts generally prefer to use this 
doctrine when the individual suffered serious harm and partially 
contributed to the tortious activity, but the harm may have 
occurred absent the malpractice.236  
In Wendland v. Sparks, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that 
“loss of chance of less than 50% is compensable,” where the 
defendant doctor failed to perform CPR to resuscitate a patient.237 
There, even though the patient had entered cardiorespiratory 
arrest and had drawn (what would be) her last breath prior to the 
defendant’s negligence, the court found the doctor liable for his 
failure to attempt resuscitation.238 Noting that the patient had been 
successfully resuscitated multiple times prior, the fact that the 
patient never made a “no code” request,239 and that the doctor 
acted against the known wishes of the patient’s husband, the court 
found that even though “the chances of successful resuscitation 
were questionable, and any recovery for wrongful death would be 
severely limited . . . even a small chance of survival is worth 
something.”240 The loss of chance has been likened to the loss of 
a lottery ticket—although the ticket “represents a less than even 
chance of recovery,” the ticket nonetheless has “clear market 
value.”241 In the concussion litigation context, the “ticket” 
represents someone who have may have suffered from a 
concussion outside of the NFL but nonetheless might have been 
healthy—or at least healthier—had the NFL not withheld 
information and opposed reform, leading to even more 
concussions and neurological injuries. 
                                                          
Kaufman, supra note 35. 
236 Phillips, supra note 228, at 85. 
237 574 N.W.2d 327, 333 (Iowa 1998). 
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2014.05.19 GUCCIONE.DOCX 5/19/2014  11:29 AM 
952 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
With the loss of chance doctrine gaining traction in a number 
of state courts,242 the same policy reasons behind its acceptance 
support an expansion of the doctrine to other claims, and 
specifically, to concussion lawsuits. Loss of chance is not 
confined to suits dealing with negligent diagnoses and has been 
accepted for claims outside the malpractice context, albeit in 
narrow circumstances.243 A number of scholars have advocated 
for a limited extension of the doctrine to tort cases more 
broadly,244 arguing for the increased use of “probabilistic 
causation,” where tortfeasors are liable in proportion to the harm 
contributed, especially in mass tort contexts.245 Professor Glen O. 
Robinson noted the “lagged effects” of harm in toxic tort cases 
(an issue applicable to concussion litigation, where the long-term 
effects of traumatic brain injuries often arise years later), and 
posited that the search for “deterministic causes” (such as 
“substantial factor” or “but for” causation) was “both artificial 
and misleading,” arguing that “the basic objectives of tort law are 
better served if liability is based on risk of injury, than if it is 
based on the actual occurrence of a harm.246 Even a “narrow” 
formulation of loss of chance, limiting the doctrine to “failure[s] 
to protect a person from a preexisting condition,” may permit 
recovery for concussion plaintiffs’ failure to warn claims, as 
failures to diagnose—like failures to warn—deal with “protection 
                                                          
242 See Paul Speaker, The Application of the Loss of Chance Doctrine in 
Class Actions, 21 REV. LITIG. 345, 346 (2002). 
243 Wendland v. Sparks, 574 N.W.2d 327, 332 (Iowa 1998). See, e.g., 
Gardner v. Nat’l Bulk Carriers, Inc., 310 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1962) (where 
defendants were liable for a reduction in a deceased seaman’s chance of 
survival after failing to search for him); Hake v. Manchester Twp., 486 A.2d 
836 (N.J. 1985) (where defendants were liable for reduction in the chance of 
survival of deceased juvenile arrestee who had attempted suicide, by failing to 
perform CPR). 
244 Fischer, supra note 38, at 606. 
245 See, e.g., John Makdisi, Proportional Liability: A Comprehensive 
Rule to Apportion Tort Damages Based on Probability, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1063 
(1989); Glen O. Robinson, Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for 
Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779 (1985). 
246 Robinson, supra note 239, at 780–81, 783. 
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against an external risk.”247  
One prevailing policy justification for extending loss of 
chance doctrine is fairness.248 This argument has particular force 
in the concussion litigation context, where a traditional causation 
rule might bar concussion plaintiffs from recovery. Due to the 
harshness of the traditional “more-likely-than-not” causation 
standard, some advocate for loss of chance under fairness 
principles, where wrongful conduct not only increased the 
incidence of a future illness, but prevented a determination of 
whether the illness would have occurred “but for” the 
wrongdoing.249 This rationale applies to the concussion litigation 
context, where the alleged misrepresentations and omissions of 
the NFL and MTBIC may have increased the likelihood of long-
term neurological injury by failing to properly address concussion 
concerns, and spreading misinformation, causing players to 
misjudge the risks involved. In addition, the possibility that the 
League intentionally concealed evidence about the seriousness of 
concussion injuries makes causation difficult to prove: how do we 
know if the plaintiffs’ long-term injuries would have occurred 
absent the NFL’s and the MTBIC’s alleged deception? 
Deterrence is another popular policy justification for the 
extension of loss of chance to concussion litigation.250 The use of 
loss of chance prevents tortfeasors who have caused less than 
fifty percent of the plaintiff’s harm from escaping liability. By 
contrast, a more traditional rule incentivizes potential defendants 
who might substantially contribute to an injury, but not 
necessarily “more-likely-than-not” have caused it, to avoid 
additional precautions.251 For example, under a traditional 
causation rule, a player who received four concussions in college 
                                                          
247 Fischer, supra note 38, at 606, 610. 
248 Id. at 626–27. 
249 Loss of chance should also be limited to cases where the duty owed by 
the defendant arose from a “special relationship,” a standard the NFL 
litigation likely satisfies. Joseph H. King, Jr., “Reduction of Likelihood” 
Reformulation and Other Retrofitting of the Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 28 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 491, 535 (1998).   
250 Fischer, supra note 38, at 627–35. 
251 Id. at 605–06, 632. 
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and two in the NFL could not argue the League caused more than 
fifty percent of his concussion-related injuries. Loss of chance 
allows him to argue that the NFL should still be liable for a third 
of the injury because it reduced his chances of survival or of 
living a healthy life.  
Though opponents of this rationale argue that the traditional 
more-likely-than-not rule actually incentivizes actors to take 
additional steps because they may be liable for more harm than 
they actually caused,252 this argument does not have as much 
force in the concussion litigation context, where it is more 
difficult to prove the NFL caused a majority of the alleged 
injuries. Still, a substantial number of states decline to use loss of 
chance at all, let alone an expansive application.253 The primary 
concern is that an extension of loss of chance will be highly 
difficult to limit.  Because an extension of loss of chance “can 
apply to all cases where a tortfeasor creates a risk of harm and it 
is uncertain whether the harm has already occurred or will occur 
in the future,” there is fear that the loss of chance would 
“swallow the [traditional all-or-nothing] rule,” rather than remain 
the exception.254 Such jurisdictions fear that permitting loss of 
chance recovery allows the compensation of speculative or 
uncertain injuries. Therefore, a significant number of 
jurisdictions refuse to consider loss of chance when the victim 
had less than a fifty percent chance of survival,255 which would be 
problematic for concussion plaintiffs. 
The Supreme Court of Florida rejected loss of chance in 
Gooding v. University Hospital Building, Inc., concerned that 
“[r]elaxing the causation requirement might . . . create an 
injustice. Health care providers could find themselves defending 
cases simply because a patient fails to improve or where serious 
disease processes are not arrested because another course of 
action could possibly bring a better result.”256 This argument is 
                                                          
252 Id. at 627–28. 
253 Alice Férot, The Theory of Loss of Chance: Between Reticence and 
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problematic, however, as loss of chance does not create a 
“heightened duty” for all actors, but instead seeks to hold 
negligent tortfeasors liable for the reduction in a victim’s chance 
of recover.257 Nonetheless, many state courts remain concerned 
that innocent parties could ultimately become liable for injuries 
they didn’t clearly cause. In its Restatement (Third) of Torts, the 
American Law Institute stated it would not take a stance on loss 
of chance, noting that it would be a “drastic” expansion of 
traditional doctrine and left the issue to state courts.258 
While loss of chance has been traditionally used only in 
individual suits, this doctrine should be applied here should future 
NFL concussion plaintiffs be certified as a class.259 There are 
compelling justifications for applying the loss of chance doctrine 
to class actions. In addition, loss of chance can actually facilitate 
class certification260 for former NFL class action plaintiffs, as it 
may increase the chance of satisfying the certification 
“commonality” requirement under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b).261 Loss of chance has the capacity to “smooth 
over many of the differences” between individual class members 
by comparing them all to a “baseline in order to determine 
damages” (for example, the incidence of brain injury in non-NFL 
playing football players), and then applying those damages pro-
rata to all members of the class.262 Without the use of the relevant 
baseline in loss of chance determinations, courts would have to 
examine class members on an individual basis to determine the 
likelihood of injury absent the tortious behavior, a process that 
would lead to a wide variety of results that would likely “destroy 
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258 Tory A. Weigand, Lost Chances, Felt Necessities, and the Tale of 
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the commonality holding a potential class together.”263 
Loss of chance, then, seems like a potentially viable alternate 
basis to alternative causation theory and will allow former NFL 
players to plead sufficient causation, despite the existence of 
other contributing factors. Though any extension of the loss of 
chance doctrine should be crafted with care,264 loss of chance is 
supported by principles of fairness and deterrence, and it provides 
an opportunity for former players to recover despite the role of 
other potential causes. Finally, loss of chance may aid in the class 
certification context by providing a baseline by which courts can 
apportion damages with less reference to the individualized 




The proposed settlement between the NFL and over 4,500 
former football players is currently an insufficient remedy to the 
extensive damage caused by the League’s inaction, failure to 
warn, and spread of misinformation, with regard to concussions 
and repeated brain trauma. While the potential settlement could 
provide some immediate aid to former players suffering from the 
most serious effects of repeated head trauma, the amount itself 
will likely be inadequate compensation for most players. Further, 
the proposed settlement allows the NFL to avoid the discovery 
process and any admission of wrongdoing, allowing the NFL to 
escape a good deal of bad publicity and public pressure to 
reform. It is due to these terms that the proposed settlement is 
inadequate and therefore should be denied.  
Given the proposed settlement’s insufficiencies, the plaintiffs 
may need to opt out and pursue litigation to receive adequate 
                                                          
263 Id. at 367. 
264 The concern is that an extension of loss of chance will be highly 
difficult to limit. Because an extension of loss of chance “can apply to all cases 
where a tortfeasor creates a risk of harm and it is uncertain whether the harm 
has already occurred or will occur in the future,” there is fear that the loss of 
chance would “swallow the rule,” rather than remain the exception, “with 
probabilistic causation completely supplanting the traditional” all-or-nothing 
rule. Fischer, supra note 38, at 606–07. 
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damages, unless the settlement is significantly reworked. In order 
for future plaintiffs to be successful they will need to be able to 
argue that section 301 of the LRMA did not preempt their claims. 
It is likely plaintiffs would avoid preemption, since the League— 
through its creation of the Mild Traumatic Brain Injury 
Committee—assumed a duty of care that is independent of the 
NFL-NFLPA’s collective bargaining agreement. Unlike 
precedent cases such as Duerson and Williams, the plaintiffs’ 
claims in In re National Football League Players’ Concussion 
Injury Litigation arise under a duty of care completely 
independent of the NFL-NFLPA collective bargaining agreement. 
Nor can the NFL rely on Stringer, as the plaintiffs here do not 
reference or implicate the duties of team trainers. While the 
plaintiffs’ claims may be “related” to the CBA, resolving them 
would not be “dependent on” or “intertwined with” the 
bargaining agreement’s interpretation, as Judge Perry recently 
found in Green v. Arizona Cardinals.   
Proving causation will be more difficult. Current and future 
plaintiffs should be able to overcome potential defenses of 
assumption of risk and contributory negligence. While athletes 
knew they risked concussions, it was nearly impossible for them 
to fully appreciate this risk, given the NFL’s obstinacy in failing 
to take such injuries seriously and fighting the increasing weight 
of science in order to preserve its own image. While some 
players may have hid (and still hide) concussions from their 
teams, the desire to do so was borne largely from the tough-it-out 
culture that the NFL deliberately crafted. By successfully arguing 
for an expansion of the loss of chance doctrine, NFL concussion 
litigation plaintiffs may find a pathway to adequate recovery for 
the harm allegedly caused by the NFL’s negligence and 
seemingly active spread of misinformation, despite multiple 
factors potentially contributing to long-term cognitive illness and 
injury. As Pro Football Hall of Famer Frank Gifford stated in 
1960, “Pro football is like nuclear warfare. There are no 
winners, only survivors.”265 Unfortunately, for many of those 
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survivors suffering from devastating illnesses, such as CTE, 
ALS, Alzheimer’s, dementia, and Parkinson’s Disease, the war 
continues. 
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